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Recent Developments

Giant Food, Inc. v. Department ofLabor, Licensing and Regulation
Disqualification of Unemployment Eligibility under Section 8-1004 of the Labor
and Employment Article Is Lawful when There Is Substantial Curtailment at the
Individual Facility or Premises
By Traci Gladstone Corcoran

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that
disqualification of unemployment
benefits under section 8-1004 ofthe
Labor and Employment Article ofthe
Annotated Code of Maryland
("section 8-1004"), applies when
there is a substantial curtailment of
work caused at the employee's
individual location of employment.
Giant Food, Inc. v. Department of
Labor, Licensing, and Regulation,
356 Md. 180,738 A.2d 856 (1999).
In so holding, the court ended an
ongoingjudicial debate over whether
"substantial curtailment" means an
individual place ofemployment or an
entire business entity.
Giant Food, Inc. ("Giant"), is a
retail grocer that owns and operates
several distribution centers,
warehouses, stores, and plants in
Maryland and other Mid-Atlantic
states. Teamsters Local 639
("Teamsters"), represented by the
Department ofLabor, Licensing, and
Regulation ("DLLR"), is a union of
truck drivers who delivered to all of
Giant's Mid-Atlantic locations. The
Teamsters went on strike after a
collective bargaining agreement
between Giant and the Teamsters
expired. The strike caused Giant's
warehouse, distribution centers, and
manufacturing plants to cease
operation, resulting in an estimated
four million dollars of lost profit.

Subsequently, over one thousand
employees who participated or
assisted in the strike, applied for
unemployment benefits.
The Board of Appeals of the
DLLR, the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, and the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland all
found that the employees were entitled
to unemployment benefits. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland granted
Giant's writ of certiorari to decide if
the Teamsters were disqualified, due
to a substantial curtailment of Giant's
operations, from receiving
unemployment benefits.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by acknowledging its role to
review and determine if the
administrative agency's decision was
based on proper legal standards.
Giant, 356 Md. at 184-85,738 A.2d
at 858. The legal issue before the
court was whether, under section 81004, which replaced Article 95(A)
section 6(e), the Teamsters were
"disqualified" from receiving the
unemployment benefits. Id at 186,
738 A.2d at 859.
The court of appeals cited
section 8-1004, specifically the
language:
(a) grounds for disqualification
. . . (1) an individual who
otherwise is eligible to receive
benefits is disqualified from
receiving benefits for each

week for which the Secretary
finds that unemployment
results from a stoppage of
work, other than a lockout,
that exists because of a labor
dispute at the premises where
the individual was last
employed.
Id. (citing Md. Code Ann., Lab. &
Empl. §8-1004(1991». Thecourt
first applied the fundamentals of
statutory construction, opining that the
plain meaning of the rule is "not
absolute," and that a court must
review a statute in light of the
"purpose, aim, or policy of the
enacting body." Id at 189, 738 A.2d
at 861. The court further stated that
any unrealistic interpretation should
be avoided. Id
The court next analyzed whether.
"premises" is defined as one particular
unit of a business operation, or the
entire business entity. Id at 190, 738
A.2d at 861-62. The court noted
that when section 8-1004 was
enacted, "factory, establishment, or
other premises," was replaced with
merely "premises." Id at 191,738
A.2d at 862. Based upon its
comprehensive review ofthe statute's
history, the court ofappeals held that
the difference in word choice had no
effect on the statute's substantive
meaning. Id. In further support of
its holding, the court relied on a
legislative report which expressly
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stated that the purpose ofthe changed
semantics in the revised section was
to modernize and clarify, and not to
create a new policy. Id. According
to the court, the report also indicated
that there was a valid attempt made
"to ensure that a proposed revision
conforms as nearly as possible to the
intent ofthe General Assembly .... "
Id. The court then turned to
subsection (a)(2) of section 8-1004
which states, "if separate branches of
work that usually are conducted as
separate businesses in separate
premises are conducted in separate
departments on the same premises,
each department shall be considered
a separate premises .... " Id at 19394, 738 A.2d at 863.
The court also discussed the fact
that the Maryland statute originated
from an English statute. Id at 192,
738 A.2d at 862-63. In Saunders v.
Maryland
Unemployment
Compensation Board, 188 Md. 677,
53 A.2d 579 (1947), the court noted
that the English statute is virtually
identical to the Maryland statute, and
that "the English disqualification
statute, since its inception, has
maintained a definition of place of
employment or work limited to each
individual site ofemployment, not the
employer's entire operations." Id
(citing Saunders, 188 Md. at 68788, 53 A.2d at 583-84).
The court went on to analyze the
meaning of the "stoppage of work"
language of section 8-1004. Id at
196, 738 A.2d at 864. The court
referred to Employment Security
Admin. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.,
292 Md. 515,438 A.2d 1356
(1982), where it held that a majority
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ofjurisdictions held the "stoppage of
work" to a "substantial curtailment"
standard. Id at 197, 738 A.2d at
865 (citing Browning-Ferris, 292
Md. at 528-30, 438 A.2d at 136465). Aware that substantial
curtailment varies and that it is
dependent upon "the type of
business" at issue, the court applied
this standard to the facts ofthe instant
case. Id at 198-99, 738 A.2d at 866.
In so doing, the court held that
Giant's activities had completely
ceased, and that the Teamsters' strike
had constituted a "stoppage ofwork"
under section 8-1004. Id
In support of its decision, the
court of appeals utilized persuasive
authority from other states with
"similarly-worded" statutes. Id at
199-200, 738 A.2d at 866-67. The
most poignant aspect ofthis analysis
came from the Supreme Court of
Nebraska. Id at 200-01,738 A.2d
at 867. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland cited Magner v. Kinney,
141 Neb.l22, 130,2 N.W.2d 689,
693 (1942), which held "that a
'stoppage or curtailment of work'
may occur in one of three forms: (1)
total cessation ofwork in the premises;
(2) cessation of work by part of the
employees, which prevents others in
the premises from working; or (3)
diminished patronage by customers,
which produces unemployment." Id
(quoting Magner, 141 Neb. at 130,
2 N.W.2d at 693). The court of
appeals also cited a case from Illinois,
which held that a "stoppage ofwork"
occurs or affects the individual plant,
or place ofemployment, but "not the
employer's business as a whole." Id
at 201, 738 A.2d at 867 (quoting

Central Foundry Div. v. Holland,
36 Ill.App.3d 998, 1002, 345
N.E.2d.143, 147 (1976)).
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland concluded that the
distribution centers, the warehouse
centers, and the manufacturing plants
ceased operation as a result of the
strikes, consistent with the intent of
section 8-1004. Id. at 203-04, 738
A.2d at 869. Accordingly, the
employees were disqualified from
receiving unemployment benefits
because "there was a substantial
curtailment of operations at each of
these premises to cause a stoppage
of work." Id at 205, 738 A.2d at
870.
In Giant Food, Inc., the court
ofappeals sets the standard for review
in cases arising out oflabor disputes,
which result in work stoppage, where
the employees are subsequently
disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits. This decision
will have a profound effect on workers
in Maryland because the courts have,
in previous cases, been unwilling to
disqualify them from receiving
unemployment if the employer's
company still operated as a whole
despite the strike. Yet courts will now
be less apt to allow benefits to
workers even where only the
individual's place of employment
ceased operations. Likewise, the
holding in this case gives Maryland
labor attorneys a bright line standard
with which to assess their active and
potential cases relating to labor
disputes.

